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of-use#LAACONNECTING  POSITIVE AND  NoRMATIvE  LEGAL THEORY
Adrian Vermeule
Positive and normative  legal theory often seem to have little to do
with one another.  Part I describes the disconnect and suggests that it
arises from two sources:  the gap between fact and value,  and the gap
between  external  and internal  perspectives  on law.  In  the following
Parts, I lay out a repertoire of strategies  and mechanisms for connect-
ing  positive  and  normative  legal  theory.  Part  II  examines  cases  in
which positive  theory serves as a direct source of normative  arguments.
Part III  examines  cases in which  positive  theory serves  as an indirect
constraint on  normative  decisionmaking.  In  the  latter  case,  positive
theory  serves  a  constructive  role  by  narrowing  the  set  of normative
arguments  that must be considered  when deciding  what to do.  Part
IV  extends the  theme of constraints  to  a second-order  question:  In
light  of our  best  positive  theories,  to  what  audiences can  normative
scholarship  be addressed?
I.  POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE THEORY DISCONNECTED
Positive and normative  legal theory  (and for that matter, political
and moral  theory, but I  will focus  on legal  theory)  often seem  radi-
cally disjunct;  it is sometimes  not clear, even  in principle,  what  posi-
tive  and normative  theory have  to  do with one another.  Two recur-
ring conceptual  problems create  this disconnect.  The first is the gap
between fact and value.  The second is the gap between internal and
external perspectives on law.  I will offer some brief remarks on each
before  discussing,  in  the  following  Parts,  how  the  gaps  can  be
bridged.
The  fact-value  distinction  is  alive  and well  in  many  quarters,  de-
spite  the best  efforts of some  philosophical pragmatists  and  the  dis-
repute of logical  positivism.  Some economists  remain  hostile to wel-
fare  economics  on  positivist grounds,  arguing  that the Kaldor-Hicks
Professor of Law,  Harvard Law School.  Prepared for the  University of Pennsylvania  Journal
of Constitutional Law 2007  Symposium,  "Positive  Approaches  to  Constitutional  Law  and
Theory."  Thanks  to Matt Stephenson,  Cass Sunstein,  Mark Tushnet, and the symposium
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criterion  and  other  staples  of normative  welfarism  require  interper-
sonal  comparisons  that are  meaningless,  epistemically  too  demand-
ing, or unscientific.  Lionel  Robbins's  original  argument against  in-
terpersonal  comparisons,  although  it  conflated  these  conceptual,
epistemic, and methodological points, argued in fact-value terms.1
Philosophical  argumentation  that  seeks  to  close  or  reduce  the
gap, such as  the distinction  between  "brute" facts that are value  free
and "institutional" facts  that presuppose  values,2  does  not fully cap-
ture the  everyday  appeal  of the distinction.  Philosophers  who deny
that the distinction captures any metaphysical truth may also admit its
utility, thus allowing that there  is a pragmatic  case for the fact-value
distinction.3  And the distinction  is part of the everyday toolkit of de-
bates  in  legal  theory.  Thus  in  the  debate  over "super precedents, 4
originalist  Randy  Barnett argues  in  part  that common-law  theorists
confuse fact and value:
An  explanation  of why  a  particular  decision  will not soon  be  over-
ruled..,  is distinct from an argument for why it ought not one day be re-
versed when  the time is ripe ....  [I] n their defense of the irreversibility of
super  precedents,  [common-law  theorists]  seem  to  be  committing  two
fundamental  fallacies.  The  first  is  the  conflation  of  the  "is"  with  the
"ought"; the second is the conflation of the "actual" with the "necessary." 5
Barnett's  first fallacy  attempts  to  sever  the  connection  between  the
positive and normative sides of precedent-based approaches to consti-
tutional  interpretation.  His  second  fallacy  addresses  not  the  fact-
value  distinction,  but the  modal  distinction  between  alterable  facts
and constraints  that are inalterable  (at least in the short run).  I take
up that distinction in Part III.
The second  gap  is  between  external and internal  perspectives  on
law.  Positive  theorists, particularly theorists from nonlegal disciplines
or legal theorists heavily influenced by those disciplines, often take an
external perspective  on  law, while  traditional  doctrinalists  stick  reso-
1  See generally LIONEL  ROBBINS,  AN  ESSAY  ON  THE  NATURE  & SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ECONOMIC
SCIENCE 136-47  (2d ed., rev. & extended 1940).
2  See generallyJohn  R. Searle, How to Derive "Ought"from "Is, "73  PHIL. REv.  43 (1964).
3  See,  e.g.,  HILARY  PUTNAM,  THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  FACT/VALUE  DICHOTOMY  AND  OTHER
ESSAYS 43-45  (2002)  (critiquing various justifications for the fact-value distinction).
4  See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Essay, Super Precedent, 90 MINN.  L.  REv.  1204  (2006)  (ar-
guing that some constitutional  decisions  have risen  to the stature  of "super precedents"
by, among other things, taking on great importance  in the public consciousness);  Daniel
A. Farber,  Essay,  The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN.  L. REv.  1173  (2006)
(discussing the tension between  the rule of law and stare decisis).
5  Randy  E.  Barnett,  Response,  It's a Bird, It's a Plane, No, It's Super Precedent: A  Response to
Farber  and Gerhardt,  90 MINN.  L. REV.  1232,  1241-42  (2006)  (footnote omitted).
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lutely to  the internal perspective.  When theorists deploy positive po-
litical models that depict "law"  as an  equilibrium outcome of institu-
tional interactions,  the  payoff is unclear from  the  perspective  of the
old school.  On  this  view, if a judge  asks  at oral argument  what the
"law"  is  in  a given  area, the  advocate  who  answers,  "The law  is what
emerges  in  equilibrium  from  your  interaction  with  other  institu-
tions,"  is  guilty of a category  mistake.  The judge  is  asking what  she
should do, and why; the external account of law  is no help with  that
question.  On  this  view, Holmes's famous  claim  that law  is  a predic-
tion of what the courts will in fact do6 is a resolutely external account
of law, one that cannot coherently be offered within legal practice.
This  problem  can  arise  from  the  other  side  of  the  internal-
external  divide  as  well.  When  the  internal  theorist  (implicitly  ad-
dressing  the judiciary)  says  that the  law  rightly understood  requires
the judge to say X, but the external theorist can show with high prob-
ability that the judge will say Y, or can show that a multimember court
deciding a series of cases will in all likelihood  say nothing coherent at
all,7  it is not clear what the relevance  of the  internal  theorist's claim
really  is.  In  Part  IV,  I  examine  the  limiting case  of  this  situation,
where  the  normative  theorist  recommends  public-spirited  measures
to  officials who, according  to the best positive  theory, have  no incen-
tive  or motivation  to  listen to such advice.  These  twin possibilities-
that positive  theory lacks  a doctrinal  payoff, and that normative  the-
ory lacks  a connection  to  the real world-emphasize  the conceptual
gap between  internal and external perspectives.
These  gaps between fact and value,  and between  internal and ex-
ternal perspectives, are problems, but there are solutions as well.  The
following Parts  offer an  analytic  taxonomy of strategies  for bridging
the two gaps, with illustrations from legal theory.
II.  THE NORMATIVE POWER OF THE FACTUAL
I will begin with cases in which positive theory serves as a source of
normative theory; the next Part examines the constraints that positive
theory  places  on normative  theory.  The  cases  in  this  Part can  be
lumped  together  under  the  rubric  of "the  normative  power  of the
6  See 0.  W.  Holmes, Justice,  Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law, Address
at  the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston  University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897),
in  10 HARV.  L. REV.  457, 461  (1897)  ("The  prophecies of what the courts will do in  fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean  by the law.").
7  See  generally Frank  H.  Easterbrook,  Ways  of Criticizing the  Court, 95  HARV.  L.  REv.  802
(1982).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
factual"8:  facts or causal mechanisms are a direct source of normative
arguments  that would not have existed  had the relevant facts or cau-
sation  been  different.  In some  cases  (examined  in  Parts  II.A  and
II.B),  the normative  power of the factual  is  rationally  defensible.  In
other cases  (examined in Part II.C),  however, the normative  power of
the  factual  operates  by nonrational  mechanisms.  The  role  of facts
and  causal  theories  in  creating  constraints,  and  thus  an  indirect
source of normative arguments, is examined in Part III.
A.  Prescriptive  Theory
In common parlance,  normative  theory encompasses  two types of
arguments:  claims about  the best means  to  adopt, given  stipulated
ends, and claims about what ends  it would be  good to adopt.  How-
ever, claims about the best means to adopt, given stipulated ends, can
usefully be given a separate label as "prescriptive" theory.  Prescriptive
theories  support conditional arguments  from  is to ought.  In the case
of individual  decisionmaking,  if your goal  is  X, and the  facts  are  Y,
then you should do  Z.  In the case of social or collective  decisionmak-
ing, if there  is normative  consensus on X, and policy  Ywould in fact
produce  X (ignoring other costs),  then  Y is a good policy.  If the goal
is to minimize  unemployment,  and the minimum  wage increases un-
employment,  then  the  minimum  wage  is  bad  and  should  be  abol-
ished.  Even  if positive  arguments  about facts and  causation cannot
directly  change  people's  ultimate  preferences  or  values,  surprising
positive claims can supply new information that changes their derived
preferences  over  different  policies,  legal  rules,  or  institutional  ar-
rangements.
The best positive political theory has prescriptive value of this sort.
An  example  is Jerry  Mashaw's  model  of the interpretive  canon  that
constitutional  questions  should  be  avoided,  if fairly  possible.  The
canon is  sometimes defended on the ground  that, after all,  the legis-
lature can reinstate the constitutionally problematic  statutory rule by
legislating  more  explicitly,  should  a  majority  desire  to  do  so.  But
Mashaw's  treatment yields  the  counterintuitive  implication  that  un-
der a regime of narrowing interpretation, "even if the legislature acts
to  'correct'  an  interpretation  with  which  it disagrees,  it will almost
never end up with its original  policy reinstated, even  if  not a single member of
8  Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine  Staatslehre  [General  Theory of the State]  338  (1929).  Of
course, I am ripping this out of its original theoretical  context.
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the legislature has altered his or her preferences."9  The  main  effect,  one
that is easy to overlook without explicit modeling, is that a narrow in-
terpretation  changes  the  status  quo point  and  thus  "reconfigure[s]
the structure of subsequent legislative bargaining." 1 0
The general point is that many normative approaches are partially
fact-dependent:  they support no prescriptions at all unless and until
facts are plugged in, although facts are  only necessary, not sufficient.
Famously,  all purely  consequentialist approaches are  of this sort, be-
cause they hold that actions  (or rules or dispositions)  are good if and
only if their factual consequences  are good; a value  theory specifying
the good is  also necessary, but facts are  indispensable.  Whether  this
is an advantage  or a defect of consequentialism  is an open question.
Critics suggest that consequentialism is epistemically too demanding,
because  no consequentialist  will  ever have  sufficient  information  to
make the required judgments, and that consequentialism is scary, be-
cause any action, however  monstrous, might be indicated by the the-
ory,  given  some  conceivable  state  of  affairs.  For  consequentialists,
however,  the fact-dependence  of the  approach  is  an  advantage,  not
least because,  in many cases,  it underscores  that when people  differ
about what  to  do,  they  are  often  disagreeing  (perhaps  implicitly)
about facts and  consequences.  Debates  over the  minimum wage  are
often driven by different estimates  of its effect on employment levels
and other  components  of the well-being  of low-wage  workers, rather
than by high political principles.
B.  Tradition  as a Source of Norms
Another interpretation  of "the normative  power of the factual" is
that tradition  can  serve  as  a  source  of norms.  Normative  theorists
(including  constitutional  theorists)  who  emphasize  tradition  attempt
to leverage from "is"  to "ought."  On this class of views,  the way things
are and  have been  is taken  as a guide for making current decisions,
perhaps  because  following  tradition  minimizes  disruption  and  pro-
tects expectations,  or because  it conserves  decisionmaking  costs,  or
because  it aggregates  the  contributions  of many  minds,  or because
evolved institutions are likely to be optimal.
In  constitutional  theory, Burkeans  and common-law  constitution-
alists  emphasize  the  role  of traditions  in giving  content to  constitu-
9  JERRY  L. MASHAW,  GREED,  CHAOS,  AND  GOVERNANCE:  USING  PUBLIC  CHOICE TO  IMPROVE
PUBLIC LAW  102 (1997).
10  Id. at 103.JOURNAL OF  CONSTITFTIONAL LA W
tional norms, understanding traditions to include both general social
and political traditions, on the one hand, and narrower judicial  tradi-
tions or precedents, on  the other hand."  Common  law constitution-
alism  also  shades  into  Dworkin's  "law  as  integrity,"  in  which  prece-
dents  are  part  of  the  legal  landscape  into  which  our  principled
justifications  must  fit. 2   The  language  of fit, however,  also  makes
precedents sound like a constraint on acceptable justifications  rather
than a direct source of norms, so integrity is an ambiguous  case.
The puzzles and problems surrounding traditionalism in  constitu-
tional adjudication are many.1 3  In the best case for traditionalists, the
relevant  tradition  has  been  continuous  since  some  point in  the  re-
mote past, so it is currently  the status  quo, and  the relevant tradition
can  uncontroversially  be  identified.  These  conditions  will  often fail
to  hold, however.  For one  thing,  traditions  notoriously  can  be  de-
scribed  at higher or lower levels of generality. 4  For another, it is not
obvious how Burkeans can deal with interrupted traditions.  Where a
tradition was followed at time 1, but was abrogated or violated at time
2, what is the good Burkean to do at time 3?  Both the time 1 practice
and the time  2 practice have their claims.
Even  if the  best  conditions  do  hold,  there  is  a further  problem
that  is  especially  troublesome."1  If judges  decide  on  the  basis  of
precedent,  rather  than using their independent judgment, a  type of
Burkean  paradox arises.  The  paradox  is that if many participants  in
the line of precedent or tradition followed the precedent or tradition
(rather than exercising their independent reason),  because doing so
was a way to improve their information, then the informational value
11  See generally Thomas  W.  Merrill,  Bark v.  Burke,  19  HARV.  J.L. & PUB.  POL'Y  509,  511-12,
515-19  (1996)  (identifying differences among originalism,  normativism,  and convention-
alism); David A.  Strauss,  Common Law  Constitutional  Interpretation,  63  U.  CHI.  L. REV.  877,
884-904 (1996)  (detailing a precedent-based  theory of the development of constitutional
law); Ernest Young,  Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation,  72  N.C. L.  REV.  619, 697-712  (1994)  (evaluating  the case  for traditionalism
in constitutional interpretation).
12  See generally RONALD DWORKIN,  LAW'S  EMPIRE 225-75  (1986)  (distinguishing "law  as integ-
rity" from other accounts, such as conventionalism and pragmatism).
13  Here I draw on the illuminating recent overview in Cass R. Sunstein,  Burkean Minimalism,
105 MICH.  L. REV. 353 (2006).
14  The Burkean  can propose simple  rules to deal with this, such as always describing the tra-
dition at the lowest relevant level of generality.  See, e.g.,  Michael H.  v. Gerald D., 491  U.S.
110,  127  n.6  (1989)  (plurality opinion).  But the problem  is why  that simple rule,  rather
than another, should be chosen.
15  This  paragraph  and  the next draw upon Adrian  Vermeule,  Essay,  Common Law Constitu-
tionalism and  the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV.  1482  (2007).
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of the  tradition is lower to  that extent; there are  fewer independent
minds contributing  to the collective wisdom.
On  this account,  Burkean  praise  for precedent  is  self-defeating.
The best contributions  to the stream of precedent are  those in which
individual judges, or small  groups  of judges, exercise  their unaided
reason.  Those who  rely on tradition because  it is,  in Burke's words,
the  "bank and  capital  of nations  and  of  ages," 6  make  withdrawals
from  the  common  pool  of  information,  for  their  private  benefit;
those who  exercise  their unaided  reason  contribute  to the  common
pool, for the good of all.
Despite all  this, the  infirmities of Burkeanism  should not obscure
the  important  theoretical role  that tradition  plays.  Right or wrong,
the claim  for tradition is  that the  way things are and have  been itself
serves  as  a  direct source  of norms, potentially  bridging  the  gap  be-
tween fact and value.  The appeal to tradition remains the most theo-
retically critical attempt to leverage  directly from "is"  to "ought."
C.  The Nonrational  Power of the Factual
So  far,  we  have  been  considering  ways  in  which  positive  theory
might serve as a source of norms for a rational decisionmaker.  How-
ever, there are also mechanisms that cause  nonrational  or boundedly
rational  decisionmakers  to  afford  weight  to  the  way  things  are-
weight that  is  arbitrary  or excessive  according  to  some  background
account of rational  decisionmaking.  At the  level  of individuals,  the
umbrella label is status quo bias, which subsumes phenomena such as
loss  aversion,  under  which  losses  from  an  arbitrary  baseline  are
weighted  more  heavily  (in  fact about twice  as heavily)  as  equivalent
gains;17  the  related  phenomenon  of  opportunity-cost  neglect,  in
which  people weigh  out-of-pocket  costs  more  heavily  than  foregone
gains,  even  if the  two  are  economically  equivalent;  and  the  endow-
ment  effect, which  under  certain  circumstances  may  cause  a  diver-
gence  between  individuals'  valuations  of  things  they  possess  and
things they could obtain.1
8
16  EDMUND  BURKE,  REFLECTIONS  ON THE  REVOLUTION  IN FRANCE  74 (Frank  M.  Turner ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003)  (1790).
17  See generally Amos Tversky &  Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in  Riskless Choice:  A  Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q.J.  ECON.  1039  (1991)  (describing prospect theory).
18  It  is not clear that the endowment effect exists;  at a minimum, it appears to be highly sen-
sitive  to the  precise  details  of the situation.  For a  recent skeptical  treatment, with  an
overview of the literature, see generally Charles  R. Plott &  Kathryn  Zeiler, The Willingness
to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment  Effect, "Subject  Misconceptions, and  Experimen-
tal Procedures  for Eliciting  Valuations,  95  AM.  ECON. REV.  530 (2005).JOURNAL OF  CONSTIFUTIONAL LAW
Confusion  arises  when skeptics point out that, in certain  cases,  a
fully  rational  individual  may  display  similar  behaviors,  because  (for
example)  the individual  is risk averse.  The problem is  that the actual
mechanisms  that bring about the  behavior  may,  in particular  cases,
have nothing to do with such post hoc redescriptions.  Some behavior
is  overdetermined,  in  the  sense  that either  the fully  rational  or the
boundedly rational decisionmaker may engage in it, for different rea-
sons;  it  is unclear  why we  should  care  that a fully  rational  decision-
maker might have done the same thing, if in fact the behavior did not
arise  in a fully rational way.  The behaviors  might be observationally
equivalent  taken  in isolation,  but careful  experimentation  can  often
trace the processes that produced them and determine whether those
processes were or were not rational.
III.  POSITIVE THEORY AS A CONSTRAINT
Besides  serving  as  a  direct  source  of  norms,  facts  and  causal
mechanisms  can serve  as indirect constraints  on decisionmaking.  Of
course there are other indirect constraints; among these are the rules
of logic, as exemplified by Arrow's Theorem, 9 and other impossibility
results.  However,  I  will  restrict  myself to  the  role  of positive  con-
straints.  Roughly, facts and causal mechanisms  can constrain norma-
tive decisionmaking  either by raising the costs of given actions,  or by
putting them outside the opportunity set altogether.  These two ways
can be reduced into one by defining actions  outside the opportunity
set  as  having  an  infinite  cost,  but  this  is  a  semantic  reconciliation
only, so I will treat costs and constraints separately.
First, the existence  of a status quo point may create costs of transi-
tion  from  the  status  quo  to  a  preferred  state;  in  some  cases,  those
costs  may  overbalance  the  gains  from  the  switch.  Transition  costs
provide  a rational interpretation  of the theorist's  common gambit of
attempting  to "shift the  burden" to  the other side.  This  is  often of-
fered  in a  rhetorical  or tendentious  spirit.  In  some  cases,  however,
the  other  costs and  benefits  of a  normative  proposal  are uncertain,
and the  existence of transition costs serves  as a tiebreaker that deter-
mines  the argument  in favor of the status quo.  This  is at the level of
legal  theory; within  legal practice, as inside a courtroom, the shifting
of burdens  is straightforwardly rational, a device  to allocate  the costs
of decisionmaking and of error.
19  See generally KENNETHJ. ARROW,  SOCIAL CHOICE AND  INDIVIDUALVALUES  46-60  (1951).
(Vol.  10:2Jan. 2008]  CONNECTING POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE LEGAL THEORY  395
Second, and more strongly, facts and causal mechanisms  may limit
the  opportunity  set  (or choice  set  or feasible  set)  of constitutional
rules  or  policies."  One  way  in which  facts  and  causal  mechanisms
constrain  normative  theory  is  through  the  maxim  "ought  implies
can."  It is  a hoary proposition  of individual-level  ethics  that one has
no obligation  to  do what one cannot  do.  It  is not obvious that this
maxim is correct; consider that it is fully coherent to say things like,  "I
should have helped him, but I couldn't."  Statements of that sort sug-
gest  a  sharp  distinction  between  our  first-best  obligations  and  our
second-best  opportunities.  On  this  view,  although  the  existence  of
constraints  might excuse compliance  with our obligations, it does not
21 eliminate their existence.  Pragmatically, however, the consequences
for decisionmaking are the same on either view.  There is no practical
sense in urging a course of action that cannot be carried out.
In  deploying  arguments  that attempt  to  dismiss some  normative
proposal as infeasible or (more strongly)  utopian, several further dis-
tinctions are  necessary.  One  is between  the short run and the  long
run.  Constraints  that are inelastic in the short run often turn out to
be elastic in the long run, so the appeal to constraints is often  invalid
if offered  as an  objection  to  the first steps  in a  long-term  campaign
for change.  Another distinction  is between  hard constraints  of tech-
nology, biology, and physics-no human can be ten feet tall-and the
softer constraints  of politics.  The  latter  typically arise from interac-
tion  equilibria  among  political  actors  and  are  highly  susceptible  to
disruption  by sudden  exogenous  shocks  or endogenous  change,  as
when threshold  effects and tipping points  create sudden discontinui-
ties in institutional behavior.  In politics,  change  is often dismissed  as
unthinkable, up until the moment at which,  suddenly,  it occurs.  Ar-
guments  from infeasibility that overlook these  distinctions  are a  type
of political  fallacy2  that are  often  invoked  to prop  up the  status quo
for disreputable reasons.
20  Here  I draw on the illuminating treatment in Lawrence  B.  Solum,  Constitutional  Possibili-
ties  (Ill.  Pub.  Law &  Legal  Theory  Research  Papers  Series,  Research  Paper  No.  06-15,
2007),  available  at http://ssrn.com/abstract=949052.
21  "[T] he fact that an agent cannot be blamed for doing A  does not show that no wrong was
committed, and no norm violated."  Robert Stem,  Does 'Ought'Imply 'Can'? And Did Kant
Think It Does ,  16 UTILITAs  42,  47 (2004).
22  See generallyJEREMY  BENTHAM,  BENTHAM'S  HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL  FALLACIES  (Harold A.
Larrabee ed.,Johns  Hopkins Press  1952)  (1824)  (describing politicians'  use  of the falla-
cies of authority, danger, delay, and confusion  to perpetuate the status quo).JOURNAL OF CONSTITTIIONAL LA W
IV.  THE AUDIENCE  FOR NORMATIVE THEORY
Finally, we  may ascend  to  a higher theoretical  level  and examine
the  role  of positive  theory  as  a constraint  on  the  appropriate  audi-
ences  for normative  theorizing.3  I  have  in  mind various versions  of
what is called,  in  economics,  the "determinacy  paradox."  If govern-
ment  is understood  as  a  benevolent maximizer of social welfare,  the
theorist's  public-spirited  or  welfare-maximizing  proposals  are  ad-
dressed  to the right audience.  Suppose,  however, that governmental
motives  are endogenized, and that government  officials are modeled
as  rationally  self-interested  actors.  Then  it  is not clear  that anyone
will  be  listening to  public-spirited  proposals;  the audience  to whom
they are  addressed will be  motivated  to adopt them only if they hap-
pen  to correspond  to  officials'  self-interested  aims.  "[I]f  what  gov-
ernments  do  is  the  result somehow  of equilibrium  behavior  of self-
interested actors, then advising government  is as senseless an activity
as -advising monopolists  to  lower prices or  advising  the San  Andreas
fault to be quiet.,
24
The determinacy paradox does not rule out all forms of normative
theorizing.  Prescriptive  theory is  still possible;  the theorist can  advise
self-interested  actors about how to pursue their interests, and may be
able to persuade  them that a proximate  goal  they previously favored
does not serve  their ultimate  or long-term  interests.  But normative
advice about  the ultimate ends  to be pursued will either fall on deaf
ears,  if it  diverges  from  the  ends  the  self-interested  agents  already
hold, or will be otiose, if it corresponds to those ends.
In  this standard  version,  the determinacy  paradox arises  because
of the  theorist's  motivational  assumptions  about the decisionmakers
to whom  the normative  proposals  are addressed.  However,  a similar
paradox  arises where normative  proposals are addressed to  decision-
makers who  are assumed  to  be subject  to cognitive  limitations.  In  a
simplistic example, the advice not to panic during emergencies  is not
very useful, if addressed to decisionmakers who are assumed to have a
propensity  to  panic  during  emergencies.  Even  knowing  their  own
tendencies  in the abstract,  the decisionmakers  may reason,  "It's gen-
erally good  advice  not to  panic, but  this situation really  is  serious,  so
23  This paragraph  draws  on a discussion  in Adrian  Vermeule,  Self-Defeating Proposals: Acker-
man on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REv.  631, 637  (2006).
24  Brendan  O'Flaherty & Jagdish  Bhagwati,  Will Free Trade with Political  Science Put Normative
Economists Out of Work,  9 ECON.  & POL. 207,  207 (1997).
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we  must take  severe measures"-a  conclusion  that may just embody
the very same panicky tendencies that the theorist diagnosed.
The  determinacy  paradox  is  ubiquitous  in  legal  theory,  particu-
larly  in  public  choice  theory, which  endogenizes  the  motivations  of
government  officials  at the  risk  of rendering  public-interested  pro-
posals  fruitless.  With  modifications,  the  problem  applies  to  norma-
tive  proposals  in  traditional  doctrinal  scholarship  addressed  (as  is
typically the case)  to the Justices of the Supreme  Court.  Proposals  in
this vein  typically attempt to bring normative  coherence  to some do-
main  of law  through  the  Dworkinian  procedure  of fit and justifica-
tion-reconciling  conflicting  cases,  texts,  and  other  legal  sources,
and  by  putting  them  in  a  normatively  attractive  light.  In  public
choice  scholarship,  and in  the attitudinal  models of judicial  motiva-
tions prevalent  in  political  science, 25  however, Justices 6  are assumed
to engage in self-interested behavior, or at best, to vote in accordance
with  their notions of good public policy, constrained at most by stra-
tegic  calculations  of the  reactions of other institutions.  If this  is the
case, it is not obvious  that anyone on the Court is listening to the doc-
trinal theorist's proposals  for advancing  the normative  coherence  of
constitutional law.
To  make  sense  of doctrinal scholarship,  one  must assume  either
that the Justices  are  directly interested  in creating  good law,  or else
that the Justices  are  indirectly  interested  in  doing  so,  because  they
care  about their  reputation with  (among others)  the  law  professors
who  care  about good law.27  In the  latter case, the Justices  are  a real
audience  for  doctrinal scholarship  because  law  professors  are  a  real
audience for the Justices'  opinions.  Whether this happy equilibrium
exists is an open question.  If it does, however, it provides a bridge be-
25  I am  oversimplifying  slightly.  A judge,  for example,  might act strategically  in  order  to
maximize the chances that his  (sincerely held)  view of what  the law requires  will  actually
be  adopted  by  the court and  will  not be  overridden  by other institutions.  More  com-
monly, political  scientists  model judges  as both strategic  and interested solely in  advanc-
ing  their  views  of good  policy,  as  opposed  to  good  constitutional  law.  See,  e.g.,  LEE
EPSTEIN  &JACK  KNIGHT,  THE CHOICESJUSTICES  MAKE  22-107 (1998)  (describing the stra-
tegic activities Justices  undertake to advance their preferred policy positions).
26  This assumption does  not necessarily  apply  to  lower  court judges,  who face  many  fewer
cases in which  the  legal  materials  are  indeterminate,  and  who  thus  have  less scope  for
self-interested or ideological decisionmaking.
27  See  LAWRENCE  BAUM,  JUDGES  AND  THEIR  AUDIENCES:  A  PERSPECTIVE  ON  JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR  100-02  (2006)  ("UJ]udges...  care  about  the  opinions  of  legal  academ-
ics.... [Liaw  professors  control  sources  of judicial  satisfaction  such  as  publication  of
opinions in casebooks  and opportunities to lecture  at law schools.").  In  Baum's picture,
law professors  are one  of the  audiences  that reputation-minded judges care  about  im-
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tween internal legal theory offered by law professors  and the external
perspective on judicial motivations-even  assuming, from an external
perspective,  that the Justices  are  not directly  motivated  to make  the
law better.